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HEALTH LAW – A CALL FOR THE ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO 
MODERNIZE THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIREMENT IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CASES. BROUSSARD V. ST. EDWARD MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM, 
INC., 2012 ARK. 14, 386 S.W.3D 385. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a patient goes to a physician’s office, she should not have to 
worry about whether the advice she receives or the procedure performed is 
considered appropriate by national standards, or simply appropriate by phy-
sicians in similar geographic locations. She should expect that the physician 
she sees is held to the same standard as all physicians across the country. 
This, however, is not the case in Arkansas. 
Arkansas is one of the few states that still uses a locality rule to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the standard of care a physician adheres to in 
medical malpractice cases.1 Doctors in Arkansas are not held to a national 
standard; instead, they are examined against the standard of care of physi-
cians in similar localities.2 In Broussard v. St. Mercy Health System, Inc.,3 
the Arkansas Supreme Court found that part of the statute containing the 
locality rule was unconstitutional.4 When the state legislature amends the 
statute, it should change the locality rule to modernize it and bring it in line 
with the majority of states. 
When the locality rule was first introduced during the late nineteenth 
century, it was designed to protect physicians who practiced in rural settings 
and who did not have ready access to the most current information in the 
ever-evolving medical field.5 While this rule served as a valuable purpose at 
the time, the free flow of information due to technological advancements, 
ease of transportation, and requirements of continuing education have ren-
dered the rule outdated and counter-productive in a time when more than 
600 medical malpractice claims are filed daily.6 Additionally, there has been 
 
 1. Michelle Huckaby Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: 
Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2633, 
2635 (2007) (listing each state’s rule to determine the standard of care in medical malpractice 
claims). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385 (holding that ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206 uncon-
stitutionally violated the separation of powers). 
 4. Id., 386 S.W.3d 385. 
 5. Tyrone E. May, Note, Locality and the Standard of Care of Medical Practitioners, 
25 ARK. L. REV. 169, 170–71 (1971). 
 6. Richard E. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 
5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 341, 346 (2005). 
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encouragement at the federal level to gather data on best practices and dis-
seminate them to the medical community.7 
Part II of this note will discuss the history of the locality rule through-
out the country, followed by a brief history of the rule in Arkansas.8 Part III 
will argue that the locality rule promotes less than adequate medical care by 
protecting physicians who choose not to stay apprised of recent develop-
ments in their field.9 The section will then demonstrate that the locality rule 
is outdated and that most states have moved away from it because of ad-
vancements in communication and technology.10 The section will conclude 
by demonstrating that the locality rule violates the most common views of 
medical ethics.11 
Finally, Part IV will call on the Arkansas legislature to modify the ex-
isting locality statute to treat professional expertise and resource availability 
separately.12 Professional expertise should be measured against a national 
standard of care. However, holding resource availability to a national stand-
ard is unreasonable and should include a geographic component.13 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the Locality Rule Nationally 
The idea of locality was first recognized in the late 1800s and was 
strictly applied.14 The doctrine of strict locality provides that physicians 
must adhere to a standard of care that is consistent with physicians in the 
same geographic location in which they practice.15 Strict locality can be bro-
ken down into two different categories.16 The first is a statewide standard in 
which the standard of care is compared to other physicians who practice in 
the same state.17 Currently there are three states that follow the statewide 
locality standard.18 The other, stricter category is the “community standard” 
 
 7. Gail R. Wilensky, The Policies and Politics of Creating a Comparative Clinical 
Effectiveness Research Center, 28 HEALTH AFF. 719, 722–23 (2009). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. See infra Part III.C. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See, e.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872); Whitesell v. Hill, 70 N.W. 750 
(Iowa 1897). 
 15. E. Lee Schlender, Malpractice and the Idaho Locality Rule: Stuck in the Nineteenth 
Century, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 361, 361–362 (2008). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Lewis et al., supra note 1, at 2635. Arizona, Virginia, and Washington currently 
have a statewide locality standard. Id. This is a particularly interesting because all three states 
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in which physicians are judged against the manner that other physicians in 
the same community practice.19 Currently only two states adhere to this 
standard.20 
The similar locality rule is analogous to the strict locality rule, but in-
stead of confining its examination to a specific geographic region, it in-
cludes physicians that are located in a similar location, within any state.21 
There are currently eleven states that apply the similar locality rule,22 includ-
ing Arkansas.23 When determining the similar location of a physician, the 
court may examine many different elements including geography, popula-
tion demographics, and even medically similar communities.24 In Arkansas, 
to determine the similarity of communities, the court looks not only to the 
population of areas, “but rather upon their similarity from the standpoint of 
medical facilities, practices and advantages.”25 
Over the years, most states have moved to a national standard of care.26 
The national standard of care requires physicians to render the same level of 
care that patients could expect in any part of the country.27 Currently, thirty 
states and the District of Columbia adhere to a national standard.28 
Not all states have a uniform standard of care. Five states have differ-
ing standard of care levels that depend upon whether the physician is a pri-
mary care physician or a specialist.29 Primary care physicians are held to a 
locality standard, and specialists are held to a national standard of care.30 
This note will discuss this, and the reasons behind it, in more detail. 
 
have very large metropolitan areas on one side of the state and the other side is primarily 
rural and a large distance from urban areas with the most modern health care, which could 
lead to complications in determining the standard of care. 
 19. Schlender, supra note 15, at 369. 
 20. See Lewis et al., supra note 1, at 2635. Idaho and New York are the only two states 
that still adhere to the same community standard. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2634. 
 22. Id.at 2635. The states include Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Tennessee. Id. 
 23. See Dooley v. Cap-Care of Ark. Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (E.D. Ark. 2004). 
 24. Scott A. Behrens, Note, Call in Houdini: The Time Has Come to be Released from 
the Geographic Straightjacket Known as the Locality Rule, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 753, 769 
(2008). 
 25. Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 770, 531 S.W.2d 945, 948 (1976). 
 26. See Lewis et al., supra note 1, at 2634. 
 27. See Behrens, supra note 24, at 770. 
 28. See Lewis et al., supra note 1, at 2635. 
 29. See id. Colorado, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota have differ-
ent standards of care for physicians and specialists. Id. Specialists are typically held to the 
heightened national standard of care because of the perceived greater level of knowledge they 
must maintain. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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B. Development of the Locality Rule in Arkansas 
Recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared section 16-114-206 of 
the Arkansas Code unconstitutional.31 In Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy 
Health System Inc.,32 the patient brought a medical malpractice suit against 
the physicians who treated her after a surgery.33 The circuit court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant and Broussard appealed arguing that 
section 16-114-206 violated section 3 of amendment 80,34 of the Arkansas 
Constitution.35 The court held that the statutory language, “[b]y means of 
expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same spe-
cialty as the defendant” violated the separation of powers doctrine by dictat-
ing to the courts what types of witnesses they could hear and ruled that the 
clause was severable.36 
The locality rule in Arkansas has been around for almost a century. The 
first Arkansas case that applied the locality rule was Dunman v. Raney.37 
 
 31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206 (2012) (held unconstitutional in part by Broussard v. 
St. Vincent): 
(a) In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie 
within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving: 
(1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care 
provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill 
and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the pro-
fession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the 
same type of practice or specialty in the locality in which he or she 
practices or in a similar locality 
(2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care 
provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care 
provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and 
(3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified med-
ical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suf-
fered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred. 
Id. 
 32. 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385. 
 33. Id. 
 34. ARK. CONST., amend LXXX, § 3 (stating that, “The Supreme Court shall prescribe 
the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all courts; provided these rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as 
declared in this Constitution.”). 
 35. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385. 
 36. Id. at 390; Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Lawmakers Weigh Competing Tort Reform 
Ideas, INS. J. (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/south
central/2013/02/12/280985.htm. In the most recent Arkansas legislative session, a constitu-
tional amendment was proposed to insert similar language, via constitutional amendment, 
that was held unconstitutional by the court. Id. This ballot measure, if approved, would be 
placed on the ballot to be ratified by Arkansans in the next statewide election. Id. 
 37. 118 Ark. 337, 176 S.W. 339 (1915). 
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The patient severely broke his leg and visited a physician, who set it and 
cared for it on repeated occasions.38 The plaintiff’s leg did not heal correctly 
and had to be amputated.39 The facts were disputed as to whether the physi-
cian or the patient was at fault for the leg not healing correctly, and thus 
who was at fault for requiring the amputation.40 In determining the standard 
of care that the physician owed to the patient, the court stated: 
A physician or surgeon is not required to exercise the highest skill possi-
ble. He is only bound to possess and to exercise that degree of skill and 
learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his profes-
sion in good standing, practicing in the same line and in the same gen-
eral neighborhood or in similar localities.
41
 
This case set the standard for determining where expert witnesses prac-
tice, which is still used in Arkansas medical malpractice cases today.42 
The locality rule in Arkansas was directly challenged in the 1976 deci-
sion of Gambill v. Stroud.43 In Gambill, the patient challenged the Arkansas 
locality rule, arguing the rule was outdated.44 The defendant practiced in 
Jonesboro, Arkansas, and the witnesses testified as to the standard of care in 
Jonesboro, Little Rock, and Memphis.45 Two of the five witnesses were phy-
sicians that had not practiced in Jonesboro, but they testified that they had 
taught continuing education classes all over the state and that they were fa-
miliar with the community and the standards of practice in the area, which 
were no different than in Little Rock or Memphis, thereby qualifying them 
as expert witnesses.46 
The plaintiff argued that the locality rule was no longer applicable, cit-
ing small-town physicians’ access to the same opportunities and resources 
as physicians in large cities and ability to stay abreast of advances in the 
industry.47 The plaintiff listed advancements such as access to “the availabil-
ity of the Journal of the American Medical Association and other journals, 
drug company representatives and literature, closed circuit television, spe-
cial radio networks, tape recorded digests of medical literature, medical 
 
 38. Id. at 340–42, 176 S.W. at 339. 
 39. Id., 176 S.W. at 339. 
 40. Id., 176 S.W. at 339. 
 41. Id. at 342, 176 S.W. at 339 (emphasis added). 
 42. See, e.g., Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 770, 531 S.W.2d 945, 952 (1976) (stating 
in the dissenting opinion that Dunman v. Raney established the standard). 
 43. Id., 531 S.W.2d 945. 
 44. Id. at 769, 531 S.W.2d at 948. 
 45. Id., 531 S.W.2d at 948. 
 46. Id. at 768–69, 531 S.W.2d at 947–48. 
 47. Id., 531 S.W.2d at 947–48. 
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seminars and opportunities,” and opportunities to converse with physicians 
in larger cities.48 
The court rejected this argument stating, “[h]owever desirable the at-
tainment of this ideal may be, it remains an ideal.”49 It reasoned that the time 
had not been reached when the education, research, and experience was 
available equally to every physician regardless of their location.50 The court 
believed that while transportation and communication advancements had 
extended beyond the boundaries of the locality rule, they had not eliminated 
them entirely, therefore, the court upheld the locality rule.51 The rule in 
Gambill still stands today, and is codified at Ark. Code Ann. section 16-114-
206(a)(1).52 
Gambill was not decided unanimously; there was a concurring opinion 
and two dissenting opinions.53 The concurring opinion did not find the plain-
tiff’s argument to be without merit, but instead felt that it was not the court’s 
place to overturn the law because it was constitutional; instead, altering the 
law should be the task of the Arkansas General Assembly.54 
The first dissent argued the locality rule was too restrictive.55 Instead, it 
would have advanced a rule that considered the “size and character of the 
community” as one of many factors in determining whether the standard of 
care was met.56 This would allow for variances in medical care to be taken 
into consideration, but would not constitute an overriding factor as with the 
current locality rule.57 
The second dissent argued for the abolition of the locality rule.58 Ac-
cording to Justice Roy, when the locality rule was conceived, there was little 
standardization in the education that physicians received and in many loca-
tions, “refresher” courses were non-existent.59 He argued that because 
“[m]edical science recognizes no geographical boundaries” anymore, then a 
law that recognized geographical restrictions was outdated as well.60 
In Arkansas, it has been codified that in any case in which medical 
malpractice is alleged and does not meet one of the three following enumer-
ated exceptions, expert testimony must be given to demonstrate the standard 
 
 48. Gambill, 258 Ark. at 768–69, 531 S.W.2d at 947–48. 
 49. Id. at 769, 531 S.W.2d at 948. 
 50. Id. at 769–770, 531 S.W.2d at 948. 
 51. Id. at 770, 531 S.W.2d at 951–52. 
 52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(a)(1) (2012). 
 53. Gambill, 258 Ark. at 770, 531 S.W.2d at 949. 
 54. Id. at 770-D, 531 S.W.2d at 951 (Byrd, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 770-E, 531 S.W.2d at 951–52 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id., 531 S.W.2d at 951. 
 57. Id., 531 S.W.2d at 951. 
 58. Id. at 770-F, 531 S.W.2d at 951–52 (Roy, J., dissenting). 
 59. Gambill, 258 Ark. at 770, 531 S.W.2d at 952. 
 60. Id., 531 S.W.2d at 952 (Roy, J., dissenting). 
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of care.61 The first is res ipsa loquitor,62 followed by information considered 
common knowledge to the jury,63 and the last exception is breach of express 
warranty.64 If one of these conditions is not met, then expert testimony is 
required.65 
III. ARGUMENT 
The next section will discuss the significant societal changes that have 
occurred since the Gambill decision that could lead to a reconsideration of 
the current locality rule in Arkansas. In addition, the section will discuss 
how the locality rule could have a negative medical outcome for patients 
and examine the locality rule against modern views of medical ethics. 
Since the Gambill decision in 1976, there have been many great chang-
es in education, communication, and technology that allow for the free flow 
of medical information—the key reasons the Arkansas Supreme Court up-
held the locality rule when it was challenged in Gambill.66 The ruling in 
Broussard gives the Arkansas General Assembly the opportunity to modern-
ize Arkansas’s standard of care rule because it must pass a bill to amend 
section 16-114-206. The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the unconstitu-
tional clause is severable; thus lawmakers could simply strike the lan-
guage.67 While that is a viable option, it would serve the best interests of the 
courts, the medical community, and the state if the legislature modernized 
 
 61. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-206 (2012) (held unconstitutional in part by Broussard v. 
St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385) (citations omitted). 
 62. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Gibbs, 305 Ark. 383, 389, 807 S.W.2d 928, 932 (1991) (Res 
ipsa loquitur in Arkansas applies when: 1) a duty of care is owed to the plaintiff; 2) the injury 
is caused by something or someone in exclusive control of the defendant; 3) the event is 
something that does not ordinarily occur without negligence; and 4) there is no evidence to 
the contrary. Id. at 387, 807 S.W.2d at 931. If these four elements are met, then the proceed-
ings do not require the testimony of an expert witness. Id. at 390–91, 807 S.W.2d at 932–33. 
If any of the elements are absent, then an expert witness is required. Id., 807 S.W.2d at 932–
33.). 
 63. See, e.g., Lanier v. Trammell, 207 Ark. 372, 377–78, 180 S.W.2d 818, 820–21 
(1944) (holding that when it is undisputed that specialists necessarily and properly follow 
routine sterilization procedures, expert testimony is not needed). 
 64. See, e.g., Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 281, 915 S.W.2d 675, 684 (1996) (holding 
that a physician cannot be held liable in a malpractice suit if he acted with a sufficient stand-
ard of care, the treatment was unsuccessful, and the patient subsequently brings a breach of 
contract suit because the issue is primarily a contract issue, and therefore doesn’t require 
expert testimony).  
 65. See Schmidt, 305 Ark. at 389, 807 S.W.2d at 932. 
 66. Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 769, 531 S.W.2d 945, 948 (1976). 
 67. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys. Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 8, 386 S.W.3d 
385, 390. 
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the law to join the majority of other states that do not currently have a locali-
ty rule for determining the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.68 
Arkansas could update its locality rule in a way that differentiates be-
tween professional expertise and resource availability when determining the 
standard of care, similar to what other states, including Mississippi, have 
done.69 In the alternative, Arkansas could move to a national standard of 
care for claims of malpractice involving medical expertise.70 When the claim 
concerns resource availability, such as availability of tests or specific facili-
ties, then it would be in the best interests of doctors and patients for Arkan-
sas to maintain a locality rule because it may be impractical for a physician 
to order tests that are unavailable locally, thereby causing extreme hardship 
for the patient. The legislature should take that into consideration when de-
termining the standard of care as similar to Mississippi.71 A resource availa-
bility argument made by a plaintiff could still require the use of expert tes-
timony from physicians from similar localities to help determine if a particu-
lar test or treatment would typically have been ordered.  The Hall court det-
ermined that differentiating between expertise and resource availability was 
an ideal way to approach the locality rule and supplied the following lan-
guage for the determination of a standard of care: 
The duty of care, as it thus emerges from considerations of reason and 
fairness, when applied to the facts of the world of medical science and 
practice takes two forms: (a) a duty to render a quality of care consonant 
with the level of medical and practical knowledge the physician may rea-
sonably be expected to possess and the medical judgment he may be ex-
pected to possess and the medical judgment he may be expected to exer-
cise, and (b) a duty based upon the adept use of such medical facilities, 
services, equipment and options as are reasonably available.
72
 
The Arkansas Legislature could improve the state of healthcare in Ar-
kansas by adopting language similar to Mississippi’s, which differentiates 
between medical expertise and resource availability.73 This section will first 
show that the locality rule promotes poor medical outcomes.74 Next, it will 
show that there have been significant advancements in education and tech-
nology since the Gambill decision.75 Finally, it will show that the locality 
rule contradicts leading theories of medical ethics.76 
 
 68. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 69. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See infra Part II.A. 
 75. See infra Part II.B. 
 76. See infra Part II.C. 
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A. Improved Medical Outcomes 
Physicians are uniquely positioned to determine what is acceptable 
medical care and what is not.77 The ability to determine what is acceptable 
medical care, paired with differing locality rules, allows for multiple stand-
ards of care across different regions of the country or even within individual 
states.78 This has been said to create a “Balkaniz[ation]” of the medical pro-
fession.79 At the time of its inception, the locality rule served an important 
purpose, however, the advancements in communication, technology, trans-
portation, and continuing education requirements have since rendered the 
rule out of date and in need of modernization.80 This argument first appeared 
as early as 1968 in Douglas v. Bussabarger,81 where the Washington Su-
preme Court cited ease of transportation, seminars, and ease of communica-
tion in concluding that “there is no longer any basis in fact for the ‘locality 
rule’”.82 
Protecting doctors from the threat of malpractice suits when they do 
not use the most diligent standard of care is bad public policy.83 If a physi-
cian holds herself out as an expert in her field, she should actively seek out 
the newest and best treatments for her patients, but not all physicians do.84 
Moving to a national standard of care gives physicians an additional incen-
tive to provide the best and most up-to-date care for their patients by de-
creasing the protections created by the locality rule.85 
 
 77. Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of 
Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient Doctors?, 
94 W. VA. L. REV. 11, 66–68 (1991). 
 78. See James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assur-
ing Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care 
Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 135 (2002). 
 79. Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968). 
 80. Id. at 796. 
 81. 438 P.2d 829, 837–38 (Wash. 1968). The court reasoned that: 
Modern means of transportation permit country doctors to attend up-to-date med-
ical seminars; the general circulation of medical journals makes new develop-
ments readily available to them, and they can easily and quickly communicate 
with the most modern and up-to-date medical centers in cities throughout the 
United States. As has been pointed out, today’s rural practitioner can and does 
give and receive advice transmitted thousands of miles over the telephone, and 
he is expected to keep himself apprised of recent developments as they are regu-
larly published in medical journals.  
Id. at 837 (citing F. Spies, Arkansas Model Jury Instructions: Malpractice, 20 ARK. L. 
REV. 86 (1966)). 
 82. Id. at 838. 
 83. See Lewis et al., supra note 1, at 2634–36. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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Conversely, the locality rule could also make the physician vulnerable 
to unnecessary malpractice actions if the standard of care used in the locality 
is more rigorous than the national standard of care.86 If a physician practices 
in different regions, then she makes herself vulnerable to potential legal 
risks for exercising her best judgment rather than conforming to local prac-
tices.87 In such a case, a physician could potentially be punished for using a 
consistent standard of care if she travels to another location where the stand-
ard of care is different, even if the patient’s symptoms and condition mirror 
patients that she has treated elsewhere.88 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been a movement to promote out-
comes research through evidence based medicine and create systems to dis-
tribute the information to physicians to improve their practices.89 When the 
2008 stimulus bill was passed, $1.1 billion was earmarked to further medical 
outcomes systems.90 Prior to the stimulus bill, two pieces of legislation were 
passed to help advance comparative research: the Comparative Effective-
ness Research Act and the Children’s Health and Medical Protection Act.91 
The purpose of these measures was to create a center to gather information 
concerning healthcare practices and interventions throughout the country 
and to house them in one system.92 There the information could be analyzed 
and then disseminated to the medical community.93 
Medical outcomes could be improved in Arkansas if the Arkansas 
General Assembly would consider adopting the national locality rule. Physi-
cians would have an additional incentive to remain current in their fields. 
This goal has become much more attainable with additional federal pro-
grams, as well as the numerous technological advancements as discussed in 
the next section. 
B. Educational and Technological Advancements 
When the locality rule was first introduced, there was little to no uni-
formity in the education that physicians received.94 In some instances, one 
could become a physician with little education past high school, subsequent-
ly practice in an area with little continuing contact with the medical com-
 
 86. Id. at 2636. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See Wilensky, supra note 7, at 722. 
 90. Id. at 719. 
 91. Id. at 722. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Behrens, supra note 24, at 757. 
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munity, and have very few opportunities to ever learn new techniques.95 
This could lead to major differences in practice from area to area, even from 
town to town.96 Over time, there have been efforts by the American Medical 
Association to standardize education requirements throughout the country, 
including stipulations such as attending continuing education classes.97 
Technology has also advanced tremendously since the locality rule was 
enacted in Arkansas. When many states migrated to a national standard of 
care in the 1970s, many cited the increase of technology as a leading princi-
ple.98 This was before personal computing, the Internet, or electronic health 
records were ever imagined, which allow physicians to better retrieve in-
formation to make correct diagnoses, to treat patients, and to communicate 
with other medical professionals.99 
In 1976, computers were still items that seemed closer to science fic-
tion than personal use.100 Today computers are in virtually every physician’s 
office in the nation, and each physician is likely to have a phone in her 
pocket that has more computing power than many super computers that once 
took up entire rooms.101 
Due to the abundance of smartphones and the prevalence of the Inter-
net, physicians have access to a seemingly endless supply of medical jour-
nals, research information, and other forms of medical expertise.102 No long-
er is a physician left on an intellectual island to make a decision. Medical 
information is so easily accessible that many patients have already re-
searched their symptoms and self-diagnosed their illnesses before they step 
foot into a doctor’s office.103 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 770, 531 S.W.2d 945, 948 (1976). 
 97. See Behrens, supra note 24, at 757–58. 
 98. See Schlender, supra note 15, at 367–72. 
 99. See Behrens, supra note 24, at 770–71. 
 100. See Exhibits, COMPUTER HIST. MUSEUM, http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?
year=1976 (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 101. See Nancy Gibbs, Your Life is Fully Mobile, TIME MAG. (Aug. 16, 2012), available 
at http://techland.time.com/2012/08/16/your-life-is-fully-mobile/ (noting that nine out of ten 
adults carry a cell phone and that a single smart phone has more computational power than 
the entire Apollo 11 space mission that successfully landed humans on the moon); Exhibits, 
COMPUTER HIST. MUSEUM, http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?year=1976 (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2012) (noting that the fastest computer of the day took up 58 cubic feet and weighed 
5,300 pounds). 
 102. See Adrian Lee, 40 Years of the Mobile Phone: Top 20 Facts, EXPRESS (Apr. 3, 
2013) http://www.express.co.uk/news/science-technology/388974/40-years-of-the-mobile-
phone-Top-20-facts. 
 103. Matthew I. Trotter & David W. Morgan, Patients’ Use of the Internet for Health 
Related Matters: A Study of Internet Usage in 2000 and 2006, 14 HEALTH INFORMATICS J. 
175 (2008) (finding that the number of patients that used the internet to look up health infor-
mation increased in the author’s clinic from 43% in 2000 to 70% in 2006, a very significant 
increase in just six years). 
684 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
Recently, the use of telemedicine has also increased in Arkansas.104 
Currently in Arkansas, there are over 400 telemedicine105 units around the 
state.106 These units allow patients to go to a unit located near them and 
communicate with a physician in another part of the state or even outside of 
the state.107 This type of technology was unimaginable in its current form 
when Gambill was decided in 1976.108 
The use of telemedicine presents new challenges to the locality rule. If 
there is a claim of medical malpractice, whose location is used to determine 
the appropriate standard of care? Will the location where the patient was 
seen be used or will the location where the physician is located be used? 
These issues have not been addressed by a court that still adheres to the lo-
cality rule, and it is unclear how a court would address these questions. 
C. Medical Ethics Concerns 
The current locality rule in Arkansas does not coincide with the major 
theories in medical ethics because it fails to promote the best physician be-
havior.109 This section will examine some of the most prevalent views in 
bioethics—the Morality View, Utilitarianism, Kantian Moral Imperative, 
and Principlism—and illustrate how the locality rule conflicts with all of 
them. 
At its most basic level, the Morality View applies only to a person’s 
behavior toward others.110 The Morality View defines what is right by creat-
ing a duty between actors.111 The underlying foundation of this duty is mu-
tual respect.112 The duty is created by the valid expectations that others have 
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come to count on in the medical profession.113 The Morality View is most 
concerned with achieving what is good for the individual person.114 When a 
patient sees a physician she expects to receive medical care that is of the 
highest quality.115 This relationship between the physician and the patient 
creates a duty that the doctor will provide a certain standard of care.116 To 
provide anything less than that standard of care, the physician will have 
breached his duty, therefore violating the Morality View.117 
Utilitarianism, one of the earlier medical ethical frameworks states that 
“[a]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”118 Every person is valued 
the same, so the right action is one that produces the most happiness for the 
largest group of people.119 In the context of medical decision making, this 
note proposes that the word “happiness” can be replaced with “health bene-
fit.” Simply put, utilitarianism is acting in a way that furthers the best inter-
ests of a community.120 The community can be society as a whole, a more 
localized community such as the community in which a person is physically 
located, or the medical community121 
When a physician does not keep up with the best practices in her field, 
she does not further the best interest of her communities and may in fact 
cause harm.122 The medical field is ever-evolving, and it is the physician’s 
duty to stay up to date with its practices.123 If a physician is negligent in do-
ing so, she causes harm to her physical community because she does not 
provide the best medical care she can.124 This lack of care could potentially 
hurt the individual, which will possibly make her less productive for her 
family and society. Physicians also hurt the overall medical community by 
failing to remain current and failing to work to advance the best practices as 
determined by the medical community as a whole.125 A physician also has a 
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duty to try to advance her profession.126 By failing to keep up with recent 
developments in the field and apply contemporary practices, a physician 
holds the profession back by continuing to practice on an outdated 
knowledge base.127 
The third ethical viewpoint, the Kantian Moral Imperative, states that 
for an act to be considered moral, one should act only in a way that the indi-
vidual would will to be universal law, in other words, only act in a way you 
would want everyone else to behave in the same circumstance.128 Immanuel 
Kant argues that an action is given moral worth if it is done for the sake of 
duty.129 In the legal sense, using Kant’s reasoning, Arkansas physicians po-
tentially act in a way that violates their duty if they do not show due dili-
gence in keeping up with the best practices in their field.130 This violation of 
duty goes against the categorical imperative because they are not acting in a 
way they would want all other physicians to act.131 
Principlism is one of the most well-known and respected theoretical 
models of bioethics in which there are four main principles of medical eth-
ics, and all four should be considered and weighed against each other when 
making a decision.132 The first principle is respect for autonomy.133 Beau-
champ and Childress define autonomy as “self-rule that is free from both 
controlling interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate 
understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.”134 
The locality rule could impose a significant burden on a patient’s au-
tonomy by restricting their options. Physicians should be able to inform pa-
tients what the options are when treating their maladies.135 If the physician 
has not done her duty to stay current with the changing medical field, she 
may not be able to accurately represent to her patient what all the options 
are.136 This could lead to a patient agreeing to a procedure that is not the best 
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for her symptoms because she is uninformed about other potentially availa-
ble options.137 
The second element of Principlism, beneficence, can simply be defined 
as “do good.”138 Beneficence is rooted firmly in the Hippocratic Oath that 
physicians will “come for the benefit of the sick,” and will administer treat-
ments “for the benefit of the sick according to [their] ability and judgment” 
and “will keep [patients] from harm and injustice.”139 The idea of benefi-
cence is framed through mutual understandings between particular groups, 
in this case patient and physician.140 It has a quasi-contractual element to it; 
the patient submits herself to the care of the physician to receive a benefit 
from the medical profession, which she assumes is the best medical care.141 
While a physician that has not performed her duty to stay informed on ad-
vancements in her field may still be “doing good” when she treats a patient, 
she does not maximize the good for society or her profession when she does 
not treat a patient that is to the best of her and her profession’s ability, which 
is required by the American Medical Association Professional Responsibly 
Requirements.142 
The third principle is non-maleficence, which “asserts an obligation not 
to inflict harm on others . . . [and] it has been associated with the maxim 
Primum non nocere: ‘above all do not harm.’”143 Harm can occur without 
malicious or harmful intent.144 In many cases, physicians can be causally 
responsible even if they were unaware that they caused harm.145 Both inten-
tional and unintentional negligence is usually considered blameworthy.146 
Some ethicists argue that this obligation of non-maleficence is stronger than 
that of beneficence.147 
A physician has the duty to remain up to date with the most beneficial 
treatments, but adherence to the Arkansas locality rule allows her to ignore 
most beneficial treatments, either intentionally or unintentionally, because it 
is not what is used in the locality.148 Instead of focusing on what the devel-
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opments are nationally, Arkansas physicians must abide by what is being 
used in similar localities.149 
This raises an interesting question: how does the standard of care ever 
evolve under the locality rule? If a standard of care is established in a simi-
lar locality, if a physician ever adopts a new procedure that differs from the 
standard, then she could be potentially liable for malpractice if an action is 
brought against her, even if her treatment has been shown to be more bene-
ficial. To prove that the standard of care was appropriate, the doctor would 
have to find a physician in a similar locality, which would likely have to be 
in a different state that adheres to a national standard of care since the ma-
jority of states now adhere to a national standard. 
The final principle, justice, is that which is considered fair, equitable, 
and appropriate treatment of what is due or owed to a person.150 At the heart 
of the principle of justice is that “[s]imilar cases ought to be treated in simi-
lar ways.”151 At its essence, the locality rule violates the justice principle 
because similar medical cases can be treated differently, based on the simple 
fact that their geographic location somehow makes their medical condition 
different.152 
Arkansas’s current use of the locality rule is not consistent with the 
most prevalent views of medical ethics. The Arkansas General Assembly 
should correct this issue by ratifying the more modern national standard of 
care for medical expertise. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When the Arkansas Legislature amends section 16-114-206 to remove 
the unconstitutional provision, it should change the law to bring Arkansas’s 
malpractice standard of care statute in line with the majority of the country. 
The educational, transportation, communication, and technological ad-
vancements have increased significantly since Dunman in 1915.153 There 
have even been significant increases since Gambill was decided in 1976.154 
The ruling in Broussard gives the Arkansas General Assembly a great 
opportunity to make these changes and modernize Arkansas law.155 Doing so 
will promote better medical outcomes by having a consistent standard of 
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care. Lastly, modernizing the law will bring the Arkansas statute in line with 
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